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are skeptical about theories of convergence. If convergence pointed the way to state socialism's future, the sweeping measures to institute a market economy in industrially developed Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union would not have been necessary. Rather than focusing on the effects of industrial growth, institutionalists insist that research on state socialism needs also to take into account underlying differences in institutional forms. Such a focus on alternative institutional forms that provide a deep structure for economic action underlies my argument that the shift from redistribution to markets gives rise to different mechanisms of stratification.
New institutionalist theory in sociology maintains that institutions shape the structure of incentives and thereby establish the constraints within which rational actors identify and pursue their interests (Nee and Ingram, in press; Cook and Levi 1990) . It builds on Polanyi's (1944; North 1977 North , 1981 insight that economies are embedded in definite institutional arrangements. In Polanyi's view, the problem with neoclassical economics is that its formal models assume the existence of a market economy. Yet comparative studies of human societies, past and present, have demonstrated a variety of institutional forms giving rise to economies organized around fundamentally different operating principles (Polanyi 1957) . Hence, the movement of goods and services in an economy is not simply a product of the aggregation of individual maximizing behavior as assumed in neoclassical economics. In societies integrated by redistribution, goods and services are collected and distributed from a center in accordance with the customs, regulation, ideology, and ad hoc decisions of those social groups that hold redistributive power. Producers pass on a larger share of the economic surplus to the state precisely because they have less bargaining power over the terms of exchange than in a market economy. Instead, the state requisitions their products and compels them to work for prices and wages fixed by central bureaus (Szelenyi 1978) . As a consequence, the institutional logic of redistributive economies differs substantively from market economies where goods and services are exchanged directly between buyer and seller (Polanyi 1957; Kornai 1980) , and from economies based on reciprocity where trust and cooperation in local social orders allow for balanced exchange (Homans 1950; Sahlins 1972) . Redistribution, market, and reciprocity, as alternative institutional forms, incorporate different structures of incentives and constraints and therefore distinct parameters of choice. Elements of each coexist in every society, at various levels, but Polanyi claimed that only one can constitute the dominant integrative mechanism of an economy.
It is not narrowly economic but is embedded in customs, social norms, laws, regulations, and the state. Fundamentally, differences in institu-tional framework are reflected in contrasting structures of property rights (Pryor 1973; Eggertsson 1990 ).
The transition from one institutional form to another entails remaking the fundamental rules that shape economies, from formal regulations and laws to informal conventions and norms. The shift to markets-well underway but far from complete in China-involves changing structures of opportunity (Merton 1949) . Whereas opportunities for advancement were previously centered solely on decisions made by the redistributive bureaucracy and within the economy controlled by it, markets open up alternative avenues for mobility through emergent entrepreneurship and labor markets. Under conditions of expanding markets, economic actors strive to institute new rules of competition and cooperation that serve their interests, both through informal arrangements and through formal institutional channel.s. This entails efforts to change the structure of property rights in a manner that enables entrepreneurs and producers to capture a greater proportion of the economic surplus, previously transferred to the state by administrative fiat. Political actors contribute to instituting change in the formal rules of the game insofar as gains in productivity increase revenues to the state (North 1981) . Such action at the margins is cumulative and gradually results in transformation of the institutional environment.
Market transition theory (Nee 1989 (Nee , 1991 (Nee , 1992 Nee and Lian 1994) maintains that as power-control over resources-shifts progressively from political disposition to market institutions, there will be a change in the distribution of rewards favoring those who hold market rather than redistributive power. Compared to nonmarket allocation, market exchange enhances the bargaining power of producers. Incentives are improved as producers retain a greater share of the economic surplus.
Opportunities for gain depend less on the personal discretion of cadres in positional power. Consequently, the growth of market institutions (i.e., labor markets, subcontracting arrangements, capital markets, and business groups) causes a decline in the significance of socialist redistributive power even in the absence of fundamental change in the political order. In sectors of the socialist economy where a decisive shift to markets has occurred, officials are less likely to gain a dominant advantage from positional power in the state socialist redistributive bureaucracy. Contingent on continuing allocative control over key factor resources, their relative advantage declines as a function of the extent to which markets replace redistribution as the coordinating mechanism of the economy.
In the state socialist redistributive economy, officials act as monopolists who specify and enforce the rules of exchange by administrative fiat and exclude private entrepreneurs from taking part in legitimate economic activities. Because economic actors depend on resources allocated from Symposium: Nee above, they strive to secure favorable access to these decision makers in order to maximize their access to scarce resources (Walder 1986) . By contrast, the shift to the market mechanism reduces dependence on superordinate bureaucratic agencies, as producers and consumers increasingly get needed goods and services through market exchanges. Marketbased exchanges stimulate the development of horizontal ties between buyers and sellers, in labor and production markets, resulting in an incremental decline in the relative value of vertical connections-political capital-and an increasing importance of network ties between economic actors in society.2
In sum, changes in the mechanisms of stratification stem from the expansion of opportunities for gain and profit centering on market institutions. Opportunities are more broadly based and diverse when markets replace and augment the opportunity structure controlled by the state.
The more developed the market economy, the greater the breadth and diversity of opportunities that develop outside the boundaries of the redistributive economy. Groups and individuals who were formerly barred from advancement in the state socialist bureaucracy and economy gain chances for social mobility through emergent labor markets and private entrepreneurship. Such growth of opportunities undermines the political power of indigenous elites in small communities (Yan 1995) . To the extent that new bases of opportunity expand, resources become embedded in alternative networks and institutions, dependence on the established elite declines, and excluded groups gain in power relative to the established elite. Importantly, such shifts in power do not entail a direct transfer of power as in a regime change but do occur as an unintended by-product of institutional change. Reflecting the changing institutional basis of power and privilege in society, elements of the administrative elite adapt to the emerging market society by becoming entrepreneurs. The movement of cadres into private entrepreneurship accelerates the decline of state socialist redistributive power because it contributes to opportunism and malfeasance among party members, exacerbating a crisis of legitimacy (Nee and Lian 1994) . As in the rise of capitalism in the West, change in the stratification order is incremental and over time.
LOCAL CORPORATISM AS A SOCIETAL INSTITUTION
Reports of local accommodations that combine redistribution and markets underscore the importance of hybrid institutional forms in the transi-2 This argument is consistent with power dependence theories (Emerson 1962; Hechter 1987 ) and social resource theory (Lin 1982) . As China shifts to market coordination, family firms and social networks will grow in importance in economic transactions (Hamilton 1991). tion from state socialism in China. Hybrid corporatist forms proliferate in mixed economies to capture the gains from trade under conditions of widespread institutional uncertainty (Nee 1992) . Local corporatism is a societal arrangement loosely coupling the formal rules of the game specified by the state and the informal procedures devised by local political and economic actors to promote market-oriented growth. Such corporatist arrangements are characterized by informality and flexibility, with long-standing personal relationships providing a foundation for complex economic transactions (Nee and Su, in press ). The cement that holds corporatist arrangements together appears to be generalized reciprocity in network-based social exchanges (Wilson 1994) . Reciprocity involves generalized exchanges based on trust and cooperation; it is fostered in symmetrical social structures, as in a kinship group or village community (Sahlins 1972) . Reciprocity differs from market exchanges insofar as it does not involve haggling over price, and it differs from redistributive exchange where the pattern of resource movement conforms to the principle of centricity with goods and services flowing to and from a central point.
Corporatist arrangements involve both market and nonmarket allocation of labor, capital, and land and entail a partitioning of property rights over collective assets between local government and economic actors through leasing agreements and responsibility contracts. As a governance structure, local corporatism conforms to the needs of industrial firms under conditions of partial reform. It reduces transaction costs by securing credible commitment in an institutional environment characterized by weak property rights and irregular monitoring and enforcement of formal rules by the central state. Socialist local governments themselves engage in political entrepreneurship, constructing institutional rules and myths to build and legitimize corporatist strategies of economic development (e.g., Lin 1995) . Rather than producing for the redistributive state, corporatist strategies are oriented to the marketplace, but they also provide welfare services to the community (Oi 1990) . In corporatist local economies, redistribution limits the profit-making activities of entrepreneurs and maintains a safety net for the poor and weak, resulting in lower levels of income inequality; by contrast in other regions, income inequality increased following an initial decline in the early 1980s (Nee and Liedka 1995) . Though it is a loosely coupled societal arrangement, solidarity is manifest in market competition with external groups and in response to predatory encroachment by the central state.
The rapid and sustained economic growth of local corporatist communities has strengthened the capacity of local government. Nonetheless, the development of rural industry is not likely to provide a viable economic base enabling redistributors to reconsolidate state socialist redis-tributive power. Analysis of the organizational dynamics of market transition indicates that change in the institutional environment brought about by the spread of markets and expansion of private property rights induces corresponding changes in the behavior of industrial firms (Nee 1992; Qian and Xu 1993) . Collective ownership forms coexist and even flourish in a market environment, but the discipline and incentives imposed by market competition lead to behavior more similar to private firms. As nonstate firms marketize, they are less likely to serve redistributive purposes (Byrd and Lin 1990) . Workers are rewarded on the basis of performance. Firms compete for better qualified workers in quasi labor markets. Managers strive to improve profitability and efficiency (Su 1994 ). Peng's (1992) analysis comparing workers' wages in rural industry and state enterprises supports this view. He argues that even while rural industry remains under collective ownership, rural firms already display behavior similar to that of private firms, which is why he classifies rural industry as "semiprivate." And indeed there is extensive informal privatization of collective-owned assets and firms (Nee and Su, in press ).
Higher productivity in marketized firms and increased demand for labor in quasi labor markets tend to push up wages, resulting in improved wages for producers (workers and managers) relative to redistributors.
Hence, market transition theory predicts that the transformation of public firms into marketized firms induces a decline in the income advantage of positional power based on redistribution even in the industrial sector of the economy. Local corporatism to be sure entails strong government, but the role of government is transformed into one similar to corporatist political institutions in market economies (Williamson 1989) .
THE LIMITS OF STATE-CENTERED ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION
Social scientists have long highlighted the commanding role of the state in controlling the socialist economy and society. The extreme formulation of state-centered analysis was the totalitarian model, which portrayed the Leninist state as imposing total control over Soviet society through the party apparat and mass terror (Arendt 1951; Friedrich 1954) . Subsequent perspectives sought to soften the harsh totalitarian imagery of an atomized society subjugated by an impersonal party-state. Skilling and Griffiths (1971) introduced the idea of interest groups and political competition to dispel the perception of a monolithic party-state. Then by highlighting the role of patron-client ties through which state control is maintained, Walder (1986) incorporated an emphasis on the informal mechanisms of state control. Despite such modifications, the focus of analysis remained centered on political dynamics within the party-state controlled the economy and society.
The response of state-centered analysts to economic reform and regime change has been to emphasize structural continuity with unreformed state socialism. Walder (1995b) , for example, argues that it is an intensification of state control through more effective monitoring and enforcement by local government, stemming from downward transfer of property rights in the state hierarchy-and not the action of economic actors in society seeking higher returns for their investment and work-that accounts for the dramatic improvement of economic performance in industry. Similarly, state-centered analysts describe a local stratification order in which the cadre elite continue to control the economy even under conditions of rapid market penetration and corresponding decentralization of economic decision making to firms and households (Oi 1992) . These scholars argue that the marketization of the industrial economy need not diminish the redistributive power of the cadre elite.
Like modernization theory, state-centered analysis minimizes the effect of institutional change on the stratification order. Emphasizing the persistence of the old stratification order, state-centered analysts claim that "the primary beneficiary of marketization is the old elite" (Rona-Tas 1994, p. 44). The main proponents of the "political capitalism" or ''power conversion" hypothesis of augmented cadre advantage elaborate their arguments in extended discursive commentaries on the Polish (Staniszkis 1991) and Hungarian (Hankiss 1990) revolutions. According to them, the cadre elite adeptly transforms its political capital into economic capital as it faces the impending collapse of state socialism. They engage in various forms of rent seeking in which they utilize their control over public assets and their political connections to reap private advantages in the emergent market economy. As their final redistributive act, cadres transfer to themselves ownership rights in privatized firms, and, by building on their initial control of firms and financial institutions, they are able to establish themselves in businesses and thereby secure increasing income advantage as the economy shifts to markets. Although similar points with respect to the commodification of bureaucratic power were developed in market transition theory (Szelenyi and Manchin 1987; Nee 1991; Nee and Lian 1994) , state-centered analysts emphasize continuity in the stratification order insofar as the cadre elite benefits more than other groups from the transition to a market economy. The evidence supporting this claim, however, is weak.3 I The only systematic empirical study is R6na-Tas's (1994) Further, the state-centered lens leads analysts to overlook the societal outcome that results in a relative decline in cadre advantage. As Kenneth Burke has said, "a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing-a focus on object A involves a neglect of object B" (quoted in Merton 1949, p. 252) . Focusing on the administrative elite, they are apt to see no evidence of such a decline in the absence of a statistically significant negative effect of cadre status on the determination of income. But this is to ignore the relative position of cadres vis-a-vis others. Power is not zero sum in the relationship between redistributor and producer, as evidenced by the rapid increase in both state revenues and household savings in China.
commenced in 1989 and was completed sometime in 1991; however, his models demonstrating "cadre" advantage regressed on 1990 income. Because R6na-Tas emphasized transition from above, the 1990 income data pose a problem for causal inference in the sequencing of events. Second, the "cadres" in his sample were former cadres, not government officials currently in power. This is a limitation because market transition theory is an argument about the declining significance of positional power of current government officials. Former cadres indeed have political capital-vertical networks-which they can mobilize to secure advantages in the new market economy. This is what R6na-Tas actually examines. However, he does not mention that his findings are very similar to those reported in the original test of market transition theory, despite the differing contexts of rural China and industrialized Hungary. In both settings, entrepreneurs from cadre backgrounds are advantaged, but cadres who are not entrepreneurs do not profit from accumulated political capital. The higher proportion of cadres entering into entrepreneurship and an income advantage for cadres operating private businesses were first reported by Nee (1989, pp. 671-73, see tables 3 and 4) and explained as a function of politically bounded markets and financial institutions (Nee 1991, pp. 268-69) . Market transition theory interprets the absence of an income advantage for cadres (current and former) who are not entrepreneurs as evidence of declining relative value of political capital. These members of the cadre status group are far more numerous, and their experience is modal for the administrative elite. Few of the studies R6na-Tas (1994, p. 44) cites as supporting the claim that the administrative elite are the primary beneficiary of marketization actually state this claim as a central point; most of them say so only in passing, and none provide other than impressionistic evidence. This, e.g., from Shirk (1989, p. 340) : "Already grumblings can be heard about the unfair advantages of cadres and their families in rural commerce; they can use their connections to gain access to lucrative business opportunities and avoid the extortionary license fees slapped on other rural businessmen by local officials."
In other words, state revenues can improve even while the significance of redistributive power in shaping the distribution of rewards declines.
Despite appearances, the "power persistence" hypothesis is consistent with the declining-significance-of-redistributive-power hypothesis (Nee 1991, p. 268; Bian and Logan 1996) .4 Cadre income need not declineand can even increase, as it has in China-for the declining-significanceof-redistributive-power hypothesis to be verified: if the earnings of many economic actors in society increase at a faster rate than that of political actors, the advantage of the cadre elite declines. For this reason, analysts of the postreform/revolution stratification order need to examine the relative gains and losses of both political and economic actors, as market transition theory does. The new institutionalist framework incorporates the state as a potent causal force but also assigns an independent role to social and economic forces, which in a period of societal transformation exert a growing causal influence on the state (Nee and Matthews 1996; Stark and Nee 1989) .
ADJUDICATING THE COMPETITIVE HYPOTHESES
The "power conversion" hypothesis of state-centered analysis, asserting that the administrative elite are the primary beneficiary of marketization, predicts increasing income growth for cadres (relative to producers). Because markets purportedly enable cadres to convert political capital to economic capital, the predicted income advantage of the administrative elite should be evident for cadres holding positional power as well as former cadres, especially those who establish private businesses. Not only should current cadres qua cadre derive income advantages for their positional power, but cadre entrepreneurs should be advantaged and obtain greater income gains from operating private businesses than do noncadre entrepreneurs.
Market transition theory predicts that the administrative elite's controlling position in the stratification order will decline and the value of their political capital depreciate incrementally following a shift to markets and corresponding changes in property rights.5 The decliningsignificance-of-redistributive-power hypothesis would be verified by a higher-income growth for producers (including entrepreneurs, managers, I The power persistence hypothesis states that market action can reinforce and even amplify redistributive power. In the original test of the theory, the mean household income of cadres more than doubled from 1980 to 1985 but so did that of ordinary farming households, while that of entrepreneurs increased at a more rapid rate.
5 The ability to buy and sell in markets assumes private rights to assets, including one's own labor power. Hence changes in the structure of property rights accompany marketization. and technicians) relative to current cadres. This key reversal in relative income advantage would reveal that social inequalities structured by redistribution are declining, even while inequalities generated by market forces increase.6 Such predicted trends will not be linear because no economy is purely coordinated by markets, and mixed economies combining markets and redistribution are the likely outcome of market transition. In other words, redistributive power will persist as a source of advantage, even while its significance declines as a function of the shift to markets. Another obvious caveat is that income gains for producers are adversely affected by economic downturns.
Both arguments recognize that during the course of market transition, cadres often strive to broker redistributive power to establish themselves in private businesses. Another way in which the hypotheses differ is with respect to the predicted trends of the cadre advantage in entering private entrepreneurship. The declining-significance-of-redistributive-power hypothesis predicts a diminishing cadre advantage in entering into and profiting from private entrepreneurship as markets thicken and a market economy is instituted. The "power conversion" hypothesis makes the opposite prediction, arguing that cadres are more likely to shift into and prosper from ownership of private businesses when the institutional framework for a market economy has been instituted by the state.
COMPARATIVE REGIONAL ANALYSIS
Regional variation in extent of institutional change-market penetration and the structure of property rights-complicates the analysis of the effect of markets in changing the stratification order in China. The predicted decline of redistributive power is likely to be more apparent in areas where markets are more developed, while in regions where markets are less developed, there may be a greater continuity with the old stratification order based on redistribution. The maritime provinces-targeted by Beijing as the experimental grounds of market reforms-have experienced a more rapid shift to markets, which sparked more rapid economic growth there. Though the maritime provinces were more developed economically prior to economic reform, the gap between coastal and inland provinces increased through the 1980s. Thus the ratio between industrial and agricultural output value of the coastal and inland regions widened, resulting in growing interregional income inequality. Even within provinces, there is considerable variation in the extent of market penetration and institutional environment. In both the highly marketized Pearl River 6 The decline of income inequality following the shift to markets is transitory. The predicted initial decline was also found by Bian and Logan (1996) in their study of income inequality in Tianjin.
Delta in Guangdong Providence, near Hong Kong and Macao, and the "Golden Triangle" area of Fujian, there is a surprising diversity of marketized forms (Johnson 1994; Huang 1989; Nee and Su 1990) . Further north along the coast, Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces show a variety of local corporatist institutional arrangements (Huang 1990; Brown 1992; Liu 1992; Liang 1994) . Analysis of the effect of regional variation in marketization needs to take such provincial and community-level variation into account. On this scale, does the extent of institutional change covary with a declining significance of redistributive power in shaping the stratification order?
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
There may be important factors exogenous to market transition theory that explain the declining significance of redistributive power under conditions of market reform. According to modernization theory, the more industrialized a community, the more similar the mechanisms of stratification will be to those found in other industrial societies. In other words, the accumulation of capital, rising income, and new jobs, not institutional change, explain the decline in the significance of positional power.
The industrialism hypothesis maintains that without change in the structure of property rights or economic institutions, a rise in the number of high-paying factory jobs will improve the relative income of producers (workers and managers) and diminish that of the administrative elite.
However, prior to market reforms, industrialized regions and urban centers provided a strong economic base for state socialist redistribution (Whyte and Parish 1984; Walder 1986) . Hence, there is no inherent incompatibility between an industrial economy and socialist redistribution.
By contrast to petty commodity production, the factory regime enables the socialist state to monitor and enforce communist rule more effectively (Burawoy and Lukaics 1992) . Indeed, state socialist redistributive power is well suited for organizing extensive industrial growth as long as surplus labor power can be shifted out of agriculture into industry (Szelenyi 1989 ).
In any case, whether industrialization and redistributive power are positively or negatively correlated, an attempt to verify a causal link between institutional change and the declining significance of redistributive power must control for the level of industralization.
These unresolved issues point to the need to test propositions from market transition theory using a national data set collected at a different point in time than the original 1985 survey that was used in the preliminary confirmation of the theory. The 1985 sample involved households in two periurban counties in a highly marketized southeastern coastal province. A national sample, with far greater variation in both the endogenous and exogenous variables, offers a more nearly definitive test of the theory. It allows a quasi experiment controlling for community-level variation in the level of industralization and taking into account regional variation in the extent of institutional change. With such more detailed analysis, it may be possible to test the new institutionalists' claim that in transition societies, underlying differences in the mechanism of stratification are caused by changes in the institutional framework that shape the structure of incentives and opportunities, and hence the parameters of choice within which political and economic actors strive to optimize power and plenty. The household as opposed to the individual is the unit of analysis, for in Chinese rural society the household serves as the production and accounting unit. Regression analyses of household income employ maximum-likelihood estimates of multilevel models. Structural models utilize both a static and dynamic approach employing a lagged dependent variable. Static mixed models are used to examine the effect of selected variables on household income in 1989. When lagged income variables are used, the regression analysis points to net returns of the exogenous variables on change in the dependent variable.
With multilevel models, to the extent households share common attributes by virtue of residence in the same locality, the assumption of uncorrelated error terms of household-level observations is violated, primarily affecting the standard errors of contextual variables (Mason, Wong, and Entwisle 1983) . To deal with this problem, multilevel models were developed, allowing researchers to test hypotheses on how contextual variables at one level affect relations at another level (Searle, Casella, and McCulloch 1992) . The multilevel model (Aitkin and Longford 1986) used in the analysis is Searle, Casella, and McCulloch (1992) write that "with balanced data REML solutions are identical to ANOVA estimators which have optimal minimum variance properties-and to many users this is a sufficiently comforting feature of REML they prefer it over ML" (p. 255).
Hierarchical poisson and logistic regression analyses are employed to test hypotheses on the effect of cadre power in securing nonfarm jobs and establishing nonfarm private businesses, the principal means by which households can achieve income gains in the era of market reform. Poisson regression models are used where the dependent variable is a count (e.g., the number of nonfarm workers). The nonlinear model employed in the hierarchical discrete regression is
where ox is a vector of p unknown fixed-effects parameter with known model matrix X, P is a vector of f unknown random-effects parameter with known model matrix Z, and the function f are evaluations of g -1, where g() is a link function (Wolfinger 1993) . The model assumes E(y | p) household income was used as the lagged dependent variable. Household income is the sum of the net income from the sale of agricultural products, the cost of food produced by the household, and the contribution of nonagricultural income-private business, cadre salary, factory jobs, service, sidelines, and an unspecified "other" category.7 Cadre households reported the highest mean income in the sample, reflecting their continuing elite status. In 1989, 29.5% of cadre and 50% of cadre entrepreneur I The income reported for cadre households is not likely to be biased downward. First, the income questions were placed in the middle of a long household questionnaire administered by public health field-workers. The items inquiring whether a cadre is present in the household appeared near the end of the questionnaire. Cadres and cadre-entrepreneurs reported the highest median income of any group except noncadre-entrepreneurs. In comparing cadre-and noncadre-entrepreneur households there is no statistically significant difference between the size of their homes and the pattern of ownership of most consumer durables (tape recorders, televisions, washing machines, sewing machines, motorcycles, and cars). Where there is a difference, all entrepreneurial households are more likely to own an electric fan and a refrigerator. On the other hand, cadre households are statistically more likely to own the above consumer durables, excepting cars, when compared to nonentrepreneurial households.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that cadre households systematically underreported their rewards.
households reported household income that placed them in the top income quintile.
The human capital of the household head is measured by the levels of formal schooling and by work experience. Primary, junior, and advanced are dummy variables for household heads who either attended or graduated from primary school, junior middle school, or senior middle school, technical school, college, or university. Because there were so few household heads with education above the senior middle school level, those attending technical school, college, or university were pooled together with those who received senior middle school education. The omitted reference category is household heads who never attended school. Age squared is added to the model in order to adjust for the assumed nonlinear relationship at the effect of age of the household head on household income. Chayanov (1966) As a control on local economic development, it is employed in analyses both of the nation as a whole (table 2) Community income provides a control for the mean household income in a village. This allows us to distinguish household income gains net of the community mean. By controlling for the mean village income, we are able to assess cadre income relative to other households in the community, as opposed to households in the region.
The emergence of a market economy is better operationalized as a regional, rather than a local, phenomenon. Controlling only for local conditions fails to take into account the full scope of institutional environments that shape incentives and opportunities for rural households. The substantial internal labor migration reported by households in the sample, for example, highlights the importance of extralocal demand for nonfarm labor. Also, marketization should be operationalized at the regional level insofar as local firms compete with firms in other areas. The coastal region includes provinces that experienced significant and often decisive shifts to reliance on market coordination and rapid integration with global markets (Yang 1990 ). Substantial foreign investments have accompanied market reform here, especially in the southeast coastal provinces, the Yangzi Delta region near Shanghai, and the Bohai Bay region, resulting in rapid incorporation into the world market economy.
I examine the effects of regional variation in the coastal provinces by distinguishing between relatively laissez-faire (Fujian and Guangdong), corporatist (Jiangsu and Zhejiang), and redistributive (Hebei, Shandong, Shanghai) provinces. I contrast these with the much less marketized inland provinces. These regional groupings represent a preliminary classification scheme for the extent of institutional change in the structure of property rights in the industrial economy after the first decade of market transition. They were identified by cluster analysis of provincial data on the relative industrial output of private, collective, and state-owned firms from 1987 to 1989.9
In the inland regions, state-owned firms produced 65.9% of the industrial output in 1989, with collective and private firms producing only 27.2% and 6.9% respectively. The dominance of state-owned firms in the industrial economy is also found in the coastal redistributive provinces.
State-owned firms in the coastal redistributive provinces produced 53.8% of industrial output, while 37.6% and 8.6% were accounted for by collective and private firms. This contrasts with the dominance of collective firms-owned by local governments-in the corporatist provinces, where 60.8% of industrial output was produced by collective firms and 33.9% and 7% by state and private firms. Only in the laissez-faire provinces do we find a mixed industrial economy in which no property form is dominant, but the output of firms that rely on markets is over 50%. There 19.4% and 35.8% of industrial output were produced by private and collective firms, with 44.8% produced by state-owned firms. Marketdriven economic growth has stimulated growing internal migration and urbanization in small towns and cities (Liang and White, in press; Parish 1994 ). The shift of surplus labor from agriculture to industry is fueled to a large extent by the increasing share of industrial output and demand for labor of the nonstate property forms, growing rapidly in the coastal provinces. By contrast, state-owned firms, which acquire labor through bureaucratic allocation, are less likely to generate labor demand that reaches beyond the urban population. Table 1 shows that townships located in the relatively laissez-faire I The cluster analysis confirmed that the industrial economy of inland provinces should be treated separately from the coastal provinces. It also confirmed the existence of the three coastal subregions-laissez-faire, corporatist, and redistributive. The results of the cluster analysis were supported by F-tests using the China-Cornell-Oxford data set. By estimating modified human capital and household composition models of household income for regional distinctions as an analysis of covariance and then estimating the model by pooling the regions a second time, it is possible to test whether regions exhibit different processes of stratification. They also conform to the qualitative studies of market transition written by field researchers: laissez-faire (Vogel 1989; Nee and Su 1990; Su 1993; Johnson 1994) , corporatist (Huang 1990; Oi 1990; Brown 1992; Liu 1992; Liang 1994; Wilson 1994) , redistributive (Lin 1995) . t Defined as the industrial output per capita divided by 100,000.
provinces have the highest median number of market-oriented nonstate firms (83.5), followed by the coastal corporatist (47), and coastal redistributive (22.5) provinces, with townships in the inland provinces (8) showing the lowest number of such firms. Disaggregating this category (separating private and collective firms) reveals that townships in the inland and coastal redistributive provinces report virtually no private firms, whereas townships in the corporatist and laissez-faire provinces already have wellestablished private economies, with the ratio between collective and private approaching parity in the laissez-faire subregion. Similarly, the highest percentage of village-level private entrepreneurs reside in the laissez-faire provinces, followed by the corporatist and then the redistributive coastal provinces, with the lowest percentage of private entrepre-neurs in the inland provinces. This pattern is seen also in the mean household income derived from private businesses. With well-established rural labor markets, the laissez-faire market provinces are the least reliant on redistribution in the allocation of off-village nonfarm jobs; only 5% of village governments in the Guangdong and Fujian sample find most of those jobs, whereas elsewhere it is close to 50%. Combined, these data confirm the utility of the regional groupings arrived at through cluster analysis. They indicate that the shift to a market economy has progressed furthest in the laissez-faire provinces, followed by the coastal corporatist and redistributive provinces, and least in the inland region.
The level of rural industrialization, however, follows the reverse order, with the redistributive coastal townships in the sample having the highest per capita industrial output and the laissez-faire townships the lowest among the coastal provinces. This is reflected in the mean number of nonfarm laborers by region reported in table 1. Overall gains in household income from 1978 to 1989 were largest in the laissez-faire provinces.
In the inland region, rural income stagnated after an initial period of rapid growth. To what extent did the administrative elite hold on to their power and privileges in the midst of all this change? NOTE.-SEs (corrected for dispersion) are given in parentheses.
* P < .10. ** P < .05.
*** P < .01. **** P < .001.
have power and privilege. Even in a market economy, bureaucrats have power and privilege, though much less relative to such an elite in a socialist redistributive economy. What the theory claims is that cadre power declines incrementally relative to producers and entrepreneurs as a function of the shift to a market economy. This prediction is verified in the interaction between cadre status and the extent of the production market in equation (1). The cross-effect interaction confirms a negative effect of local marketization on income returns to cadre status. Examining the cadre advantage a standard deviation above and below the mean for production markets reveals a contrast of .16 [.495 + -.069 (3 + 1.837)] and .42, respectively. Where the production market is most developed, cadre status has a net negative effect on household income (-.09) and, in areas with the fewest nonstate firms, the net cadre advantage is greatest (.5 0). These findings confirm that the thicker the market environment, the lower the income return for local cadres. A similar effect of market-oriented economic growth can be seen in the interaction between cadre status and mean community income reported in equation (2). (The analysis was done separately due to collinearity between the two crosseffect interactions.) The finding indicates that the more affluent the community, the smaller the income advantage of cadres holding positional power in the county bureaucracy. The cadre advantage is substantially less (.20) in affluent communities than it is in poorer communities (.43) based on the mean community income plus or minus the standard devia-tion. Table 1 indicates that the richest communities are located in the marketized laissez-faire provinces. Other possible interactions between the contextual and household variables were not significant.
Overall, after taking into account the interaction effects, the betas for entrepreneur and nonfarm labor are substantially larger than that for cadres, which suggests a household may now be better off pursuing economic goals, rather than securing positional power in the local bureaucracy as in the past. An extra nonfarm laborer in the household has a much larger effect on nonfarm income than cadre position. None of the political capital variables is significant, nor is the cadre entrepreneur advantaged. This was not the case in the earlier tests of market transition theory, and the change reflects the greater extent of the market by 1989.
In the pursuit of plenty, the labor force participation of nonfarm entrepreneurs and workers, and the human capital of the household head predict higher household income. Moreover, female-headed households are not were not significant. However, Parish, Zhe, and Li (1995) found diminished redistributive power of the administrative elite in the wake of expanding local labor markets.
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At the household level, work experience and household size and composition predict the chances of obtaining nonfarm jobs. Except for the laissez-faire provinces, education has a strong effect on the chances of obtaining nonfarm work. As for households reporting a cadre relative, this variable is significant for the nation as a whole. In the regional analyses, only (surprisingly) in the laissez-faire subregion is the variable a statistically significant predictor of participation in nonfarm work. Other measures of political capital fail to show a significant effect. It may be that kinship constitutes a bridge tie (Granovetter 1973 )-and not the "strong tie" that opens the door to opportunity for the job-seekerespecially in large lineage villages common to the southeastern coastal provinces where 15% of the sample report a cadre relative. According to this interpretation, kinship ties to cadres serve as a conduit of information about the availability of jobs outside the village.
Turning now to the question of laissez-faire exceptionalism, in these provinces it appears that none of the contextual and few of the household variables predict the chances of obtaining nonfarm jobs. Why? In the laissez-faire provinces market-induced economic growth was so rapid that rural households with surplus labor could readily find nonfarm jobs.
So plentiful are nonfarm jobs that these provinces serve as a virtual magnet drawing millions of migrants from poorer inland provinces in search of nonfarm jobs unwanted by local farm households. In any case, households in the marketized coastal provinces have on average 2.73 times as many male nonfarm workers as households in the inland areas, and this increases to 5.58 times as many in the case of female nonfarm workers. Although kinship ties to cadres in the laissez-faire provinces confer some advantages in securing nonfarm jobs, the greater advantage stems from residence in a marketized region.
Thus far we have focused on the relative standing of cadre and other households in 1989. But the declining-significance-of-redistributivepower hypothesis emphasizes the trajectory of income change, rather than privileges currently held.10 Accordingly, let us now ask to what extent local officials did or did not make exceptional economic gains during the transition period.11 In other words, were households that 10 Because the dependent variable pools agricultural income together with income streams derived directly from market transactions, the test is biased to favor the null hypothesis.
" The same models were computed for a static analysis of household income by region and similar results were obtained. Interested readers may write to the author for copies of these tables.
possessed a greater stock of political capital able to achieve an advantage in growth of income relative to other households? By comparing the betas affecting change in household income, it is possible to identify which social group-entrepreneurs, producers, or local officials-is likely to gain the most relative to others from the shift to a market economy.
According to market transition theory, the less marketized inland provinces experience less change compared to the more marketized southeastern coastal provinces, which shifted to a stratification order shaped more by market than by redistributive institutions. The parameter estimates in table 4 for the less marketized inland provinces conform to an expectation of slower incremental change. In the inland provinces, the administrative elite continue to enjoy positive returns on positional power in local government (reflected in increase in household income). However, the betas for entrepreneur and nonfarm labor are larger than that for cadres, indicating that a noncadre household with an entrepreneur or nonfarm worker experiences greater gains in household income than a household with a current cadre. 2 Neither cadre entrepreneurs nor households with former cadres and cadre relations experience advantages in income growth.
The analyses of household income for the coastal redistributive provinces (table 4, col. 2) show that cadres lack a statistically significant advantage; however, the interaction between cadre status and entrepreneur shows a net positive return, while entrepreneurs without redistributive power are at a relative disadvantage. The "power conversion" hypothesis finds support in the finding that the income growth of cadre entrepreneurs is highest of any group in the coastal redistributive provinces. However, these cadre entrepreneurs (N = 8) constitute .9% of the sample in this region, whereas households of current cadres make up 17%. In coastal redistributive provinces, the more broadly based source of relative gains in household earning are nonfarm jobs.
The interaction between current cadre and entrepreneur suggests that local officials may be using their political power to establish private businesses. Table 5 reports results of a mixed model logistic regression analysis. It shows that neither current nor former cadre status has a statistically significant effect on the odds of entering into entrepreneurship in the 12 In a separate analysis not reported here, I controlled for the amount of start-up capital used by entrepreneurs and found that it failed to achieve statistical significance in all regions of China. The lack of a significant return to the amount of start-up capital indicates that the commitment to private entrepreneurship is more important than the actual amount of capital invested. In other words, private entrepreneurship results in a higher rate of growth in household income whether a household has greater or lesser accumulated capital to invest in starting up a business. The coastal corporatist provinces exhibit processes of stratification that represent a significant departure from the pattern of social inequality produced by state socialist redistribution (Szelenyi 1978) . Initially it would appear that the corporatist region is similar to the inland region:
cadre position has a significant effect on change in household income (table 4) . But distinctive to the corporatist provinces, the income returns of nonfarm workers, entrepreneurs, and cadres fall within a narrow band, with somewhat higher income returns to nonfarm laborers and entrepreneurs. Corporatist communities appear to be able to specify and enforce rules of income distribution consistent with egalitarian principles, resulting in declining income inequality between households from 1978 to 1989. As a result, income inequality declined steadily as seen in the coefficient of variation over the three years (1978, 1983, 1989) In the laissez-faire provinces, household heads unexpectedly receive no advantage to education. The income effects of junior middle and advanced education do not turn statistically significant and negative until after controlling for nonfarm workers. This is because the household head is more apt to be involved in agriculture.'6 Analysis of discrete income streams for the nation as a whole by agriculture, private business, and nonfarm sources not reported here indicates that education has a 13 In a separate analysis not reported here, I control for the rank of cadres. In this analysis village-level cadres exhibit a positive significant effect, while market town cadres show a negative effect. Unlike the inland region where market town, administrative town, and village were significant, other ranks in the laissez-faire provinces show no positive income effect for cadre status.
14 In other regions of China, the absence of a statistically significant income effect of nonfarm jobs found by village governments may be interpreted as evidence of the emergence of quasi labor markets. Across all of the regions, the impact of producers on the household's earnings is positive and robust. Moreover, the contribution of a nonfarm worker to the household's income stream is greater than that made by a cadre. In all but the coastal redistributive provinces, the income gains of private entrepreneurs are greater than those of cadres. The widest gap in income growth favoring producers-farm and nonfarm workers and entrepreneurs-relative to cadres occurs in the laissez-faire provinces.
17 In the earlier test of market transition theory, the education of the head of household also failed to have a significant effect. Only when the educations of husband and wife were pooled did education show an effect on household income (Nee 1989) . This was not possible here because the spouse's education was not available.
Such evidence, combined with the control on the level of local industralization, lends support to the new institutionalist causal arguments on change in the mechanism of stratification.'8 Contradicting the industralism hypothesis, the less industrialized and more marketized coastal provinces-Guangdong and Fujian-showed the least continuity with the old stratification order. Moreover, the more industrialized coastal provinces revealed more continuity with the stratification order structured by redistribution. However, though cadre entrepreneurs were advantaged in the coastal redistributive provinces, officials not in private business
were not. Though current cadres experienced significant income returns in the corporatist region, this did not entitle them to a higher growth of income relative to other groups. Rural industry is more highly developed in the coastal redistributive and corporatist provinces, yet members of the cadre status group are not advantaged in securing nonfarm jobs for family members and relatives and in becoming private entrepreneurs.
CONCLUSION
The analysis here confirms that the stratification order of rural China began a transformative change during the 1980s. Especially in the marketized coastal region, households moved up and down in relative economic standing, driven by new rules and mechanisms for getting ahead.
The old rules of the game no longer worked as they did in the Maoist era, and households that followed those rules discovered that they fell in relative economic standing. However, households that were quick to adjust to an emergent market economy discovered new rules for getting ahead. These households experienced rapid increases in household earning power. By 1989, only 30% of cadre households in the sample were in the top income quintile. That cadre households make up a relatively small percentage of the households in the top income quintile supports the main claim of market transition theory. Most households in the top income group were newly affluent producers and entrepreneurs not from cadre background.
Even in the absence of regime change, a rapid shift to markets incrementally causes a relative decline in the significance of positional power based on redistribution and relative gain in the power of producers and entrepreneurs. The interactions testing the effect of local marketization and resulting affluence on the income returns to the administrative elite 18 The control on industrial output indicates that in the maritime provinces, the level of industrialization does not directly effect change in household income; but it has a significant negative effect in the inland region. Yet, table 4 shows that industrial output has a robust effect on nonfarm income in the nation as a whole, though its effect on total household income is negative. property (Zhou and Logan 1994) . For these reasons, many of the unanticipated features of the emergent stratification order are likely to stem from the impact of socialist hybrids and their governance structure, local corporatism, in altering the mechanisms of stratification.
In the stratification order based on socialist redistribution, the political power of cadres entitles them to a greater share of the rewards than others with the same human capital and household characteristics. This condition persists in urban centers where the structure of property rights remains largely unchanged and redistribution continues to be institutionally dominant, as Walder's (1992) analysis of nonwage benefits using 1986 data from Tianjin, a northern industrial city, indicates. In cities, nonmarket allocation of labor continues, and emergent labor markets are confined mainly to the second economy. For these reasons, cadre status continues to be associated with controlling the distribution of rewards.
In socialist redistributive economies, cadres stand at the pinnacle of the stratification order. The main mechanism of stratification is bound up with access to and control over redistributive institutions: mainly the party and state bureaucracies. Households compete to secure redistributive power, either directly by holding office or through the acquisition of network ties that guarantee ease of access to officials in power. In con-trast, gains in earning power in the emerging stratification order shaped by market forces are derived through jobs in marketized firms (e.g., joint ventures) or through entrepreneurship. Like other households, cadres too strive to adjust to the new opportunity structure created by markets.
Many in fact turn to entrepreneurship seeking to secure a privileged place in the new stratification order. In the initial stages of market transition, cadre entrepreneurs enjoy an advantage in the pursuit of market power.
Their control over the disposition of scarce resources not available in the marketplace confers class advantages based on redistributive power.
However, the cadre advantage is diminished as the leverage gained from redistributive power erodes in the wake of expanding markets and corresponding changes in the structure of property rights.
Tests of market transition arguments in the urban context are at an early stage. Analyses of income returns in Tianjin (Bian and Logan 1996) and Shanghai (Nee and Cao 1995) The application of the Stalinist growth model produced extensive in-dustrial growth without markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Erlich 1977; Szelenyi 1989) . Similarly in China, industrial growth in the 1950s was accomplished through the elimination of markets and bureaucratic mobilization of resources (Schurmann 1966) . After 1989, Eastern
European societies experienced rapid marketization, yet this did not give rise to economic growth. Hence, extensive industrial growth is an inappropriate, and at best, faulty measure of the extent of marketization.
Market transition theory maintains that institutional change-the emergence of market institutions (e.g., labor and capital markets)-causes the predicted change in the mechanisms of stratification. In the absence of such institutional change, it predicts continuity in the stratification order.
In focusing almost solely on change in the state organizational hierarchy and on the fate of the cadre elite, state-centered analysis overlooks the pursuit of power and plenty by economic actors in society. Although the state plays a critical role in initiating and sustaining the transition to a market society, research needs to move beyond the limits of statecentered analysis to take into account the societal wellspring of transformative institutional change.
